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18 MAY 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT : Degree of Militancy in Soviet Propaganda

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. Following Moscow's release of Khrushchev's harsh remarks at the Big Four meeting, Soviet propagandists widely reiterate his statement that negotiations are impossible under conditions in which the U.S. President has not disavowed reconnaissance flights. But no impression of a crisis atmosphere is conveyed in Moscow's broadcasts either for home or foreign consumption. (No bloc propaganda source mentioned the U.S. combat-readiness test until 1700 GMT on 17 May, when an East Berlin broadcast in Arabic cited political observers as calling this measure "an expression of the warmongers' desire to spread war hysteria and poison the international atmosphere.")

a. There are continued expressions of Soviet indignation over the U-2 flights, but no undue Soviet muscle-flexing or boasts of Soviet military superiority. For example, the continued voluminous propaganda on the Soviet space-ship satellite does not bring up any military implications of the launching. Despite Khrushchev's reiteration in Paris of the threat of retaliation against U.S. bases, no available broadcast since then has repeated his threat. (Earlier, such retaliatory threats had largely been confined to broadcasts beamed abroad, with the Soviet audience hearing nothing about a danger of accidental war.)

b. Moscow radio reports of Soviet public support for Khrushchev's Paris statement--including remarks said to have been made at mass support

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meetings--do include abusive references to the President and Secretary Hartar personally. But at the same time, there are continued expressions of hope that the West will emulate the USSR's policy of peaceful coexistence.

c. No marked hardening of Soviet propaganda on subjects unrelated to the summit meeting has been discerned since Khrushchev's Paris speech.

3. There are positive indications that Soviet propagandists did not know ahead of time the nature of Khrushchev's remarks in Paris. Up until an hour before the speech was released, Radio Moscow was still publicizing expressions of hope by both Soviet and foreign personalities that the summit talks would be successful. A service message in a TASS Cyrillic transmission at 1918 GMT on 16 May instructed the Soviet regional press to refrain whenever possible from publishing "various commentaries and reactions transmitted on 16 May in connection with the summit"--an obvious reference to the comment expressing hope for a successful summit meeting.

GEORGE G. CARAY

Assistant Director for Operations

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